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Externalisation, Globalised Value Chains, and the 
Invisible Consequences of Social Actions 
Bernd Sommer∗ 
Abstract: »Externalisierung, globalisierte Wertschöpfungsketten und die un-
sichtbaren Folgen sozialen Handelns«. Recently, advanced political economies 
have been described as externalisation societies whose relatively well-off ma-
jorities live off the resources, labour forces, and life chances of others. This pa-
per illustrates social processes of externalisation by referring to the example of 
globalised value chains for the production of common consumer goods, in par-
ticular, cars and clothing. Drawing on Norbert Elias’ figurational sociology, 
globalised value chains can be described as chains of interdependence. Elias 
identifies the growing length and complexity of chains of interdependence as 
one of the central social preconditions that contribute to the civilising of be-
haviour and emotions, including increased foresight and growing empathy with 
people independent of their group affiliation. Zygmunt Bauman provides an 
alternative perspective to theorise externalisation processes related to the cur-
rent formation of value chains: Due to the length and complexity of functional 
dependencies, significant consequences of social actions recede from the sight 
of actors. Conceptualised this way, globalised value chains are no social prereq-
uisites for an increased foresight and scope of mutual identification, but – on 
the contrary – undermine these processes. The paper critically discusses both 
theoretical perspectives on the behavioural and emotional implications of the 
globalisation of value chains. 
Keywords: Externalisation, global value chains, globalisation, habitus, figura-
tional sociology, empathy, pollution, consumption. 
1.   Introduction1 
The German sociologist Stephan Lessenich (2016) has described advanced 
political economies as “externalisation societies” whose relatively well-off 
majorities live off the resources, the labour forces, and the life chances of oth-
ers. According to Lessenich,  
                                                             
∗  Bernd Sommer, Norbert Elias Center (NEC), Europa-Universität Flensburg, Auf dem Campus 
1, 24943 Flensburg, Germany; bernd.sommer@uni-flensburg.de.  
1  The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewer whose comments helped to sharp-
en the argument. 
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the model of socioeconomic development of the advanced capitalist econo-
mies in the Global North […] rests on the principle of practicing a way of life, 
a mode of producing and consuming, that is all but generalizable: The Global 
North can live, produce, and consume as it does because others do not – and 
cannot – do so. (Lessenich 2015) 
This paper illustrates processes of externalisation by referring to globalised 
value chains for the production of common consumer goods. First, the two key 
concepts of this paper – “externalisation” and “global value chains” – are going 
to be briefly introduced. In the following section, the globalised value chains 
related to the production of automobiles and clothing are schematically de-
scribed. This comprises the description of practices and processes of externali-
sation associated to these particular value chains. It is argued that the extensive 
length and high complexity that is characteristic for most of today’s value 
chains is constitutive for the current externalisation of the negative social and 
environmental impacts related to the production of consumer goods. In recent 
years, a growing interest in the field of “global value chains” (GVCs), “value 
chain analysis” and “value chain upgrading” as well as corresponding research 
could be witnessed. Along with academic research institutions2 these examina-
tions are driven by international organisations, such as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) or the World Bank as well as development and human 
rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In addition to academic 
sources, the following depiction also draws on so-called grey literature, i.e. 
materials and research produced by government departments, international 
organisations and NGOs. While international organisations as well as the lead-
ing research institutions working with the global value chain framework rather 
stress the economic benefits and potentials of participating in global value 
chains – for instance increased economic growth rates and employment – 
NGOs predominantly focus on harmful social and environmental impacts asso-
ciated with the globalisation of value chains. 
In the fourth section of this paper, the extensive globalisation of value 
chains is theorised from the perspective of Elias’ figurational sociology as well 
as Zygmunt Bauman’s conceptualisation of modernity. These two alternative 
ways of theorizing the behavioural and emotional implications of globalised 
value chains and processes of externalisation are elaborated and it is argued 
that empirically both theoretical mechanisms can be witnessed simultaneously. 
                                                             
2  Leading actors and institutions applying the global value chain perspective are organised in 
the network of the Global Value Chains Initiative (GVCI) that was founded by the Center on 
Globalization, Governance & Competitiveness (CGGC) at Duke University, the Institute for 
Development Studies at the University of Sussex, and the Industrial Performance Center at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (GVCI 2017A). 
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2.  Externalisation and Globalised Value Chains  
2.1  The Concepts of “Externalities” and “Externalisation” 
In economics, the discourse about “externalisation,” or more precisely, so-
called “externalities” has a relatively long tradition. Externalities are defined as 
“indirect effects of consumption or production activity, that is, effects on 
agents other than the originator of such activity which do not work through the 
price system” (Laffont 2008). The origins of the concept can be traced back to 
Henry Sidgwick (1838-900), who first articulated the idea of “spillover ef-
fects,” and to the British welfare economist Arthur C. Pigou (1877-959), who 
receives most of the credit for elaborating the concept (McConnell et al. 2009). 
Building on the distinction between spillover costs and benefits, economists 
usually analytically distinguish between negative and positive externalities 
(Jaeger 2005, 76). For instance, air pollution can be regarded as a negative 
externality associated with automobile use: without political intervention, nei-
ther the producers nor the users of cars cover the costs of air pollution. Bee-
keeping for honey is an example that is associated with positive externalities 
(ibid.). A spillover effect linked to beekeeping is the pollination of flowers; the 
economic value generated by the pollination may even exceed the value of the 
harvested honey. These examples already illustrate that economists usually 
focus on the economic value of externalities. A prime example for focussing on 
monetary aspects of externalities is the so-called “Stern Review,” in which Sir 
Nicholas Stern described anthropogenic climate change as “the greatest and 
widest-ranging market failure ever seen” (Stern 2006, i) and argued that “early 
action on climate change outweighs the costs” (ibid.). 
From a sociological (and other non-economic) perspective(s), this focus on 
monetary issues appears to be insufficient. For instance, considering traffic 
accidents as another externality related to automobile use, the analytical 
boundaries of describing externalities solely by “costs” and “benefits” become 
evident: Of course, for a society also the economic costs of traffic accidents can 
be calculated (Parry et al. 2007, 383). However, it should be obvious that this is 
only one aspect and a very limited perspective on the harmful societal conse-
quences related to traffic accidents. The same holds true for most kinds of 
environmental degradation caused by human induced pollution. Though it is 
possible to estimate the monetary loss associated, for instance, to sea level rise 
due to climate change; the loss of people’s homeland entails many more socie-
tal dimensions than financial aspects. 
Stephan Lessenich put forward two more shortfalls related to the economic 
understanding of externalities: (1) On the micro economical level, Lessenich 
criticises the focus on individual decision making in the economic externalisa-
tion discourse (Lessenich 2016, 46). For instance, according to a standard eco-
HSR 42 (2017) 4  │  117 
nomic argument, negative outcomes of economic activities result from so-
called information failure, i.e. poor decisions made with faulty or incomplete 
information. (2) Applying the concept of externalities to the macro level, ac-
cording to Lessenich, economists equate societal processes with market pro-
cesses, as if the whole society functioned according only to the market princi-
ple (ibid.).  
In contrast, Lessenich’s sociological understanding of externalisation com-
prises the dimensions of “structures,” “mechanisms” and “practices” (ibid., 50). 
“Structure” refers to power asymmetries between certain societies and groups 
(ibid., 52). The “mechanism” of externalisation is, according to Lessenich, 
exploitation (ibid., 57f.). Lessenich emancipates the concept of exploitation 
from Marxian theory that focuses one-dimensionally on the appropriation of 
surplus value by capitalists. His concept of exploitation also includes other 
modes of one-sided concentration of benefits in a social relationship, such as 
the utilisation of natural resources, cultural capital, and the lives of others 
(ibid., 58). Finally, the “practices” of externalisation follow a specific habitus, 
which members of externalisation societies share (ibid., 60f.). All three dimen-
sions of externalisation – structure, mechanism, and praxis – are inherently 
interwoven: Only due to past and present power asymmetries within the world 
society, transnational exploitation has become possible (for instance, “land 
grabbing,” extracting natural resources, and making use of pre- or early-
industrial forms of labour conditions in the Global South). Members of the 
powerful externalisation societies habitualised (i.e. incorporated) specific social 
practices that rest on various forms of exploitation and are highly exclusive (for 
instance, maintaining a level of consumption that can only be fulfilled by using 
the ecological resources and sinks of other world regions). A specific feature of 
this habitus is that living off of expenses of others is taken for granted by the 
members of externalisation societies and thus becomes (partially actively 
made) invisible on an everyday level (ibid., 181). 
According to Lessenich, the externalisation society is no novel phenomena 
of the 21st century. On the contrary, processes of externalisation have been a 
characteristic feature of global capitalism from the very beginning (ibid., 31). 
The economically extremely successful model that developed within the so-
called early-industrialised societies during the last 500 years was ab initio 
based on the support of labour forces and the influx of resources from “out-
side,” especially (former) colonies (Mauch 2014, 35). This paper shows that 
nowadays due to globalisation of value chains, the externalisation of harms to 
the “outside” of the relatively powerful societies can be achieved: globalising 
value chains is currently a key feature of externalisation processes, i.e. of shift-
ing the negative consequences of certain social practices from the centres of 
contemporary capitalist economies to social groups and individuals living in 
their periphery. In other words, globalising value added processes are a mode 
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in which the exploitation of labour and nature is organised in today’s world 
society. 
In the following description of the externalisation processes related to the 
production of cars and clothing, and especially in the section that theorises 
these empirical examples, not only the mechanisms of externalisation (exploita-
tion) but also its structures (power relations) and practices (and their corre-
sponding habitus) are repeatedly addressed. However, before elaborating the 
empirical cases and their theoretical implications, the concepts of “value chain” 
and “global value chain” are briefly introduced. 
2.2   Global Value Chains (GVCs)3 
According to The Global Value Chains Initiative at Duke University “the value 
chain describes the full range of activities that firms and workers do to bring a 
product/good or service from its conception to its end use and beyond. This 
includes activities such as design, production, marketing, distribution and sup-
port to the final consumer” (GVCI 2017B). The International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO) provides a similar definition: “A value chain describes the full range 
of activities that are required to bring a product or service from conception, 
through the intermediary phases of production and delivery to final consumers, 
and final disposal after use” (ILO 2015). A global value chain is described as 
“divided among multiple firms and geographic spaces” (GVCI 2017B). So-
called lead firms, typically Transnational Corporations (TNCs), coordinate the 
dispersed tasks and activities within such transnationally fragmented value 
chains (UNCTAD 2013, 125). Theoretically, it is possible that “a value chain 
[is] contained within a single geographic location or even a single firm (think 
about a fruit that is grown, packaged, sold and consumed within one country)” 
(GVCI 2017B). However, in recent years it has become a distinctive feature of 
value chains that they are spatially extensive, organisationally fragmented, and 
highly dynamic (ibid.). To give an example, Figure 1 shows a value chain for 
passenger and transit rail vehicles in the USA. 
Even without counting tier three companies for the production of train vehi-
cles (including the supply of main materials and parts inputs) as well as infra-
structure-related equipment, maintenance and refurbishing, the value chain 
comprises contributions of approximately 300 companies and manufacturing 
locations in 35 US states and various countries outside the USA. It goes with-
out saying that the analysis of such a value chain is an extremely complex and 
extensive endeavour. Therefore, the following exemplary description of value 
chains for cars and clothing will be highly schematic and claims in no way to 
                                                             
3  Sometimes “Global Value Chains” (GVCs) are also referred to as “Global Commodity Chains” 
(GCCs), however in corresponding research, GVCs is the more recent concept (Blair 2009, 1).  
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be a systematic analysis of the corresponding transnational production net-
works. 
Figure 1:  US Value Chain for Passenger and Transit Train Vehicles  
Source: Lowe et al. 2010, 27. 
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2. Two Examples of Globalised Value Chains and Related 
Mechanisms of Externalisation: Cars and Clothing 
2.1  Example I: The Global Value Chain for Cars 
Roughly, the global value chain for a car can be described as followed: the first 
step of the value chain comprises the extraction of various ores and minerals 
required for car production, such as copper, iron, or bauxite, predominantly in 
countries of the so-called Global South. In the case of copper, for instance, 
prime producing countries are Chile or Peru (Müller 2017, 8). Every single car 
contains up to 28 kg of copper; German car companies only needing an esti-
mated 300,000 tonnes per year for their car production (BfdW 2016, 9). After-
wards, during the second step of the value chain, these ores are processed, for 
instance from iron into steel, or from bauxite into aluminium. This mostly takes 
place in so-called newly industrialised countries and emerging economies such 
as China or India (Müller 2017, 10). The third step of the value chain consists 
of the production of individual components or entire systems; such as breaks or 
batteries by a network of various supply companies. To give one example, 
according to their own information, Volkswagen relies on 40,000 suppliers in 
58 countries (BfdW 2016, 15). These suppliers work with requisite sub-
suppliers of their own, and so on. Finally, the lead firms assemble the compo-
nents – often in the country of their origin – and produce the actual car.  
Drawing on the sociological understanding of externalisation as presented 
by Lessenich, the focus of the following description of the externalities related 
to the value chain of cars lies on what economists call “negative externalities.” 
Further, bearing the insufficiency of the economists’ analytical reduction to 
monetary aspects in mind, this account is carried out in a rather qualitative 
manner.  
During the first two steps of the value chain, negative externalities appear to 
be especially severe; for example, in its various forms, mining accounts for 
numerous human rights abuses around the world (Spohr 2016). Often, connect-
ed to mining activities, local and indigenous communities are expelled or re-
settled without adequate compensation, with local authorities frequently crimi-
nalising protests against mining projects. Currently, it is estimated that one 
million children work in mines across the globe. Additionally, extraction activi-
ties in so-called developing countries are regularly accompanied by the viola-
tion of social and environmental standards as well as incidents of corruption 
(Müller 2017, 1). Copper mining in countries of the Global South constitutes 
no exception from these developments (ibid., 2).  
The processing of these materials in the refineries and steel works – the sec-
ond step of the value chain – equally comprises early-industrial forms of labour 
exploitation, such as child labour or labour conditions without social security, 
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etc. (BfdW 2016, 9ff.). Workers of refineries regularly report about health 
issues such as pneumonia, breathing difficulties, and tuberculosis. Additionally, 
processing ores and minerals can also be highly damaging to the environment 
(ibid.). For instance, for one ton of aluminium, 2-3 tons of toxic mud are pro-
duced (ibid.). If this mud is not professionally disposed of, severe environmen-
tal and health risks arise. 
During the third step of the value chain, these materials are processed, again 
mostly on the production sites of so-called emerging economies, making use of 
pre-Fordist forms of labour exploitation, as well. For instance, the German 
development agency Brot für die Welt (“Bread for the world”) reports about 
working hours with up to 80 hours per week and relatively low salaries. Even if 
local minimum wages are respected, in many cases this does not guarantee a 
sufficient income, as often local minimum wages are simply too low (ibid., 12). 
The “lead firms” within the value chain often request compliance with the 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of the International Labour Organ-
ization (ILO). However, due to their complexity and length, compliance within 
the entire global value chain cannot be sufficiently monitored. For instance, 
Bosch – one of Volkswagen’s suppliers – declares to Brot für die Welt:  
Due to the high numbers of suppliers and sub-suppliers within the value chain, 
for Bosch, comprehensive monitoring of the related process steps is not possi-
ble. (ibid., 14)4  
Volkswagen, the company that finally assembles all components, declares 
something similar:  
The supply chain in the car industry, with the multitude of parts that are used 
for every individual car, is very complex […]. Therefore, the complete moni-
toring of every gram of every natural resource that is used for car production 
poses a great challenge. (ibid., 15)5  
However, it becomes apparent with every further step in the value chain – 
especially if the assembly sites of the lead firms are located in the Global North 
– that the externalisation phenomena linked to production gradually diminishes. 
Based on his research concerning the value chains for automobile production in 
the Argentinian region of Córdoba, Klaus Dörre describes that working condi-
tions become increasingly precarious the further they are detached from the 
lead firms that finally assemble the cars (Dörre 2014, 32). Due to the globalisa-
tion of the value chains, the same companies that are regulated in a Fordist 
                                                             
4  Own translation of the following German original: „Aufgrund der hohen Anzahl von Liefe-
ranten und Unterlieferanten sind der vorgelagerte Teil der Lieferkette und die damit ver-
bundenen Prozessschritte für Bosch nicht flächig zu überwachen“ (BfdW 2016, 14). 
5  Own translation of the following German original: „Die Zulieferkette in der Automobilin-
dustrie bei der Vielzahl der Teile, die in einem Auto verbaut sind, [ist] sehr komplex [..]. Da-
her ist ein lückenloser Nachvollzug eines jeden verbauten Gramms eines jeden einzelnen 
Rohstoffes eine herausfordernde Aufgabe“ (BfdW 2016, 15). 
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mode in their countries of origin – with strong unions and employee participa-
tion, relatively high wages and social security – are able to make use of pre-
Fordist modes of labour exploitation in peripheral and semi-peripheral coun-
tries of the Global South (ibid., 29). Again, Volkswagen serves as a good ex-
ample: While mining in Peru or Indonesia often goes hand in hand with human 
rights abuse and extremely poor working conditions, members of the perma-
nent staff in Wolfsburg work 35 standard weekly hours, are of the best paid 
manual workers in Germany, and enjoy relatively high social security and 
safety standards as well as further benefits. Mainly environmental impacts – 
especially the emission of greenhouse gases or extensive water consumption 
(Jungmichel et al. 2017, 25) – remain to be detected at this tier of the value 
chain. Figure 2 schematically depicts the value chain for cars as well as related 
phenomena of externalisation.6 
Figure 2: Schematic Summary of the Value Chain for Cars and Related 
Mechanisms of Externalisation 
Source: Own Graph. 
 
Next, the value chain for clothing production is outlined. Due to limited space 
and many similarities to the previous example, the various steps of the value 
chain and related externalisation phenomena will be described simultaneously.  
2.2  Example 2: The Global Value Chain for Clothing  
Today, most clothing is manufactured in China, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, 
Turkey as well as other developing countries and emerging economies (AF-
WA/CCC 2014, 11). During the first three tiers of the value chain (the produc-
tion of fibre, processing, and tailoring) pre- and early-industrial forms of labour 
are dominant; including forced and child labour for the production of cotton 
                                                             
6  The externalisation phenomena associated with automobiles are not sufficiently described 
by solely focussing on the production of the vehicles and its value chain. Negative exter-
nalities stemming from the usage of automobiles further include local and global pollution, 
oil dependence, traffic congestion, and traffic accidents (Parry et al. 2007). 
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(BfdW 2016, 23). Extensive working hours, payment below the living wage7 as 
well as the prohibition of unionisation are no exception. According to the Asia 
Floor Wage Alliance (AFWA), an international alliance of trade unions and 
labour rights activists; the minimum wage in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka covers 
only 19% of the living wage, in Cambodia 25% of the living wage, and in India 
26% of the living wage (ibid., 31).  
Figure 3: Schematic Summary of the Value Chain for Clothing and Related 
Mechanisms of Externalisation 
Source: Own Graph. 
According to the Fair Wear Foundation, wages for sewers only make 1% of the 
T-shirt price when sold by retailers in the Global North (BfdW 2016, 28). Safe-
ty at work poses a particular problem; made especially visible to the global 
public when in April 2013 a clothing factory at the Rana Plaza in Dhaka, Bang-
ladesh, collapsed, leading to the death of more than 1,100 employees and ap-
proximately 2,500 injured people. Moreover, particularly within the first two 
tiers of the value chain – the production of natural and chemical fibre, the 
bleaching, coloration, and impregnation – are accompanied by severe health 
risks for the employees and often cause serious environmental damages (ibid., 
25). European or US companies predominantly organise marketing and 
transport. Finally, globally produced clothing is sold by retailers such as Wal-
Mart, Primark, Hennes & Mauritz, C&A, etc. for less than the price of a cup of 
good coffee to consumers of externalisation societies. Here, almost no direct 
                                                             
7  ”Living wage” refers to the income necessary for employees to meet their basic needs.  
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environmental impacts are recorded (Jungmichel et al. 2017, 13). After usage, 
rag traders collect old cloths and resell them, for example on the African mar-
ket, where it obstructs the development of local industries (BfdW 2016, 29). 
2.3 The Global Value Chain Economy as a System of “Organised 
Irresponsibility” 
Both value chains could of course be described much more thoroughly. This 
description does not claim to cover the complete value chains and all related 
negative externalities, but attempts to give a rather broad overview. Before 
theorising the globalisation of value chains and associated aspects of externali-
sation from the perspectives of Eliasian and Baumanian sociology, some fea-
tures of the development of the global economy shall be carved out that be-
come manifest by these examples: The global value chain economy constitutes 
a new level of globalisation. Of course, transnational trade is anything but new, 
and phases of globalisation and de-globalisation alternate in the course of histo-
ry (Wolf 2014). However, the degree of trade within global value chains – 
where thousands of components are traded globally, in order to produce one 
good – which developed during the last twenty years, marks a new point of 
economic globalisation. This trade has only been made possible by innovations 
in communication technologies as well as in the transport sector. José Ángel 
Gurría, general secretary of the OECD, phrases it as follows:  
Since the late nineties, international trade and investment have undergone ac-
celerated changes with the emergence of global value chains (GVCs), which 
have had important consequences for enterprises and governments, as well as 
a bearing on the activities of trade and investment promotion agencies. Enter-
prises now locate different stages and activities across the globe. The process 
of research and development, design, assembly, production of parts, marketing 
and branding are no longer concentrated in one location, but are instead in-
creasingly located across different countries. (OECD 2012) 
As mentioned above, organisations such as the OECD and the World Bank 
promote a rather affirmative perspective on the globalisation of value chains. 
Bearing in mind the empirical cases of value chains for cars and clothing, as 
well as their implications, a diverging estimation is possible, too: Organising 
production processes in globalised value chains systematically exploits lacking 
or lower social and environmental standards in certain world areas. It seems 
that only due to globalised value chains, many consumption goods can be sold 
at today’s low prices. In other words, “absolute cost advantages” – gains from 
international trade that have already been described by Adam Smith – are now-
adays realised by internationally diverging social and environmental standards, 
combined with the absence of functioning governance structures at production 
sites worldwide. Due to the lack of transparency, which seems to be constitu-
tional for highly globalised value chains, so-called “lead companies” cannot 
sufficiently monitor the compliance of ecological and social standards within 
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the value chain (see the examples of Bosch and Volkswagen above). In short, 
the globalisation of value chains constitutes a key feature of externalisation 
mechanisms in today’s world economy; it enables the exploitation of labour 
forces and nature in the Global South, makes the consequences of these activi-
ties grossly invisible and allows members of the externalisation societies in the 
Global North to buy common consumer goods for relatively low prices. Refer-
ring to Ulrich Beck’s World Risk Society, the global value chain economy 
constitutes a system that is characterised by “organised irresponsibility” (Beck 
1999, 6). 
3.  Theorising Globalised Value Chains and Externalisation 
3.1  Elias: Process Sociological Perspectives on Global Value Chains 
In the context of globalised value chains,  
firms and workers in widely separated locations affect one another more than 
they have in the past. Some of these effects are quite straightforward, such as 
when a firm from one country establishes a new factory or engineering centre 
in another country, and some are more complex, such as when a firm in one 
country contracts with a firm in another country to coordinate production in 
plants owned by yet another firm in a third country, and so on. (GVCI 2017B) 
Drawing on Norbert Elias’ figurational sociology, global value chains can be 
described as “chains of interdependence” (Elias 2012). Through the current 
formation of value chains on a global scale, not only enterprises, but also pri-
vate individuals become dependent on numerous transactions with others in 
order to meet their daily needs. However, bearing the previously outlined ex-
amples of value chains for cars and clothing in mind, one might wonder if these 
chains rather represent “chains of dependence” than chains of interdependence. 
Of course, the power chances that become manifest in these examples are dis-
tributed extremely unequally.  
For instance, contemporary value chains are described as highly dynamic 
because “lead firms” react instantly to price shifts by changing or diversifying 
their suppliers and developing alternative supply in order to make their supply 
chains more resilient (OECD 2012). However, according to Elias’ figurational 
sociology, in every social relationship mutual dependence can be witnessed – 
even in a relationship that is as imbalanced as the relationship between a new-
born and its parents (Elias 1996a, 77). Only if the ties between individuals 
completely break down do mutual dependencies vanish. According to Elias, the 
diverging degrees of dependence also define the power relations between inter-
connected actors: If one actor – let’s say a baby boy – is more dependent than 
his counterpart – let’s say his mother – his chances to influence the behaviour 
of the actor he forms a relationship with are relatively small; babies obviously 
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influence their parents’ behaviour; but their potentials are limited, which regu-
larly results in frustration and a lot of crying on the side of the baby.  
Transferring these theoretical insights from figurational sociology to the 
case of globalised value chains, it can be argued that only due to the unequal 
degrees of dependencies between “lead firms” in the Global North and suppli-
ers in the Global South and their asymmetric power relations the various harm-
ful impacts of production can be externalised. However, having Elias’ theoreti-
cal understanding of power in mind, the term “externalisation” itself becomes 
problematic to a certain extent: from the perspective of figurational sociology 
there is no such thing as “external” or “outside” within in a social relationship. 
It is precisely due to the imbalanced dependencies between actors that the 
processes of “externalisation” – the exploitation of the labour forces – become 
possible. 
In his civilising theory, Elias identifies the growing length and complexity 
of chains of interdependence as one of the main social mechanisms that con-
tribute to civilising behaviour and emotions, including increased foresight and 
growing empathy with people independent of their direct group affiliation 
(Elias 1995, 410).8 Following this reasoning, at first glance, the globalisation of 
value chains is supposed to lead to an increased global empathy with people in 
the Global South who suffer from pre-modern working conditions in order to 
produce consumer goods for relatively well-off societies in the Global North. 
However, it is important to note that Elias distinguishes between the “possi-
bility” and “necessity” of social development (Elias 1996a, 178), meaning that 
societal development is by no means deterministic or even goal-directed. 
Although a later stage or phase of societal development requires a certain pre-
ceding development, this does not mean that an earlier stage of development 
does necessarily lead to a specific, corresponding later stage. For the issues 
discussed here, this means that the lengthening and widening of chains of in-
terdependence could lead to the lengthening of the scope of identification and 
accordingly to processes of civilization. However, the pure lengthening and 
widening of the chains of interdependence does not necessarily lead to the 
growing of empathy between human beings. Indeed, on an everyday level, 
identification with people negatively affected by exploitation within global 
value chains remains relatively low. 
In his essay “Changes in the W-I-Balance” Elias (1996b) further elaborated 
on the divergence between developments on the societal and emotional level of 
individuals. Elias described a “drag effect” (Elias 1996b, 281) of habitus, refer-
ring to social phenomena when people’s perceptions and emotions lag behind 
the actual degree and scope of societal interdependencies. His prime example 
was the factual integration of humanity on a global scale; while we-images of 
                                                             
8  The other major social process that, according to Elias, contributes to the civilising of be-
haviour and emotions is state formation (Elias 2012). 
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individuals and processes of identification remain primarily related to the level 
of the nation state. In the context of global value chains a similar “drag effect” 
seems to be noticeable. The fact that cars from Volkswagen (just to stick to the 
established example) are labelled as “Made in Germany” and that many people 
really believe that these cars are “made in Germany” points to a situation where 
perceptions lag drastically behind the factual degree and scope of interdepend-
ence.9 Also on an emotional level, the case of globalised value chains illustrates 
that individuals are often not able to experience the human suffering and envi-
ronmental degradation that is structurally incorporated into the production of 
common consumption goods. In the light of Elias’ figurational sociology this is 
not surprising, since today’s global value chains are characterised by highly 
imbalanced dependencies (see above). 
3.2 Global Value Chains from the Perspective of Baumanian  
Sociology 
Zygmunt Bauman provides an alternative model to understand theoretically 
externalisation processes related to the current formation of value chains. In 
Modernity and the Holocaust, Bauman describes the “invisibility of casual 
connections in a complex system of interaction” (Bauman 1996, 26) as a char-
acteristic feature of modern societies. Bauman explains:  
With most of the socially significant actions mediated by a long chain of com-
plex casual and functional dependencies, moral dilemmas recede from sight, 
while the occasions for more scrutiny and conscious moral choice become in-
creasingly rare. (ibid., 25) 
Bauman regards this mechanism as central for a sociological understanding of 
the Holocaust. However, the crucial point is that Bauman considers this mech-
anism as not limited to the case of the Holocaust or other genocidal processes, 
but as a characteristic of modernity or modern societies in general. This does 
not mean that in modernity genocidal and other highly destructive develop-
ments are inevitable. Bauman, however, detects something distinctively “mod-
ern” in the phenomena of mass violence in the 20th century:  
Having emancipated purposeful action from moral constraints, modernity ren-
dered genocide possible. Without being the sufficient cause of the genocide, 
modernity is its necessary condition. (Bauman 1991) 
Bauman himself also provides a more contemporary example for “moral blind-
ness” triggered by long chains of complex functional dependencies:  
To understand how that astounding moral blindness was possible, it is helpful 
to think of the workers of an armament plant who rejoice in the ‘stay of execu-
                                                             
9  Cosmopolitan organisations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) seem to adopt a 
more adequate perspective concerning contemporary production structures and speak of 
“Made in the World” in the context of global value chains (WTO 2017). 
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tion’ of their factory thanks to big new orders, while at the same time honestly 
bewailing the massacres visited upon each other by Ethiopians and Eritreans; 
or think how it is possible that the ‘fall of commodity prices’ may be univer-
sally welcomed as good news while ‘starvation of African children’ is equally 
universally and sincerely, lamented. (Bauman 1996, 24) 
Conceptualised this way, growing chains of interdependence (as they manifest 
themselves among others in global value chains) are no social preconditions for 
an increased foresight and scope of mutual identification, but – on the contrary 
– undermine these processes.  
Recently, the German economist Niko Paech also drew on Bauman in order 
to describe the behavioural consequences of functionally and spatially differen-
tiated production networks (Paech 2016). According to Paech, splitting com-
plex production processes into numerous strictly separated tasks leads to a 
situation in which every actor is guided by a specific instrumental rationality 
(“Zweckrationalität”) that is only related to his/her specialised function (ibid., 
136). Thereby, the consequences of the complete production process – espe-
cially its environmental consequences – remain hidden for every single actor 
involved (ibid.). Since in modern economies production and consumption are 
two entirely separated spheres, according to Paech, the systemic fading out of 
all ethical and non-economic effects even includes consumers, who become 
blind to the results of their own consumption habits (ibid., 137).  
Bauman himself supports his argument by the reasoning of the philosopher 
John Lachs, who described in his work similar phenomena:  
The remarkable thing is that we are not unable to recognize wrong acts or 
gross injustice when we see them. What amazes us is how they could have 
come about when each of us did none but harmless acts. (Lachs 1981, 13) 
Here the parallel to the presented empirical cases of global value chains and 
related phenomena of externalisation is striking: Many people were truly 
shocked when learning from the news about the collapse of the clothing factory 
in Dhaka in April 2013. However, most of them cannot imagine that their last 
shopping tour to Benetton or Primark could have anything to do with it.10 The 
processes of externalisation described here for the value chains for cars and 
clothing are in no way exceptional. Similar descriptions could and have been 
put forward for the value chains of smart phones and other information tech-
nology (Carolan 2015), meat consumption (BfdW 2016; HBS/BUND/Le 
Monde Diplomatique 2014) and the production of many other everyday con-
sumer goods. Thus, they form a constitutive part of social practices in modern 
“externalisation societies” (Lessenich 2016). Building on the insights from 
Bauman, it becomes understandable how externalisation societies, due to the 
globalisation of value chains, are able to establish a “regime of invisibility” 
                                                             
10 According to media reporting, clothing for these two companies – among many others – 
was produced in the collapsed factory (Forbes 2013; USA Today 2013).  
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(ibid., 181f.) concerning the devastating consequences of their mainstream 
practices.  
4.  Conclusion 
This paper linked the concept of global value chains to the current sociological 
discourse on externalisation. It showed that the globalisation of value chains is 
connected to the key mechanism of externalisation, i.e. exploitation, and helps 
to obscure its consequences: Natural resources are extracted mostly in relative-
ly powerless countries of the Global South. These materials are processed on 
the production sites of so-called emerging economies, making use of pre- or 
early-industrial forms of labour exploitation. Consequently, they are sold as 
various consumption goods to a global consumer class that predominantly lives 
in the early-industrialised countries of the Global North. Finally, the often 
hazardous waste of production and consumption is disposed of in subordinated 
countries, or – as in the case of carbon dioxide – dumped into the atmosphere 
or the oceans. 
Additionally, this paper has presented two alternative ways of theorizing the 
behavioural and emotional implications of globalised value chains and process-
es of externalisation. But how do we now make sense of these alternative 
views? Do growing chains of interdependence and complexity in society poten-
tially lead to an increased foresight and scope of mutual identification, or – on 
the contrary – do they undermine these processes? Empirically, both can be 
witnessed: On an everyday level, “moral blindness” where people are not able 
to oversee the consequences of their decisions, is dominant. On a more institu-
tional level, however, growing foresight and empathy can be witnessed, too: 
The many reports of the NGOs and development agencies, from which empiri-
cal material was drawn for this paper, can serve as indicator for this. They 
intend to make the suffering visible and lobby for political action to change the 
situation. Another example: after the collapse of the factory at the Rana Plaza 
in Bangladesh an “Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh” was 
established by international and nongovernmental organisations and has been 
signed by over 150 global fashion brands. Furthermore, the German govern-
ment founded the so-called Textilbündnis (Partnership for Sustainable Tex-
tiles), which aims at increasing social and environmental standards along the 
whole value chain. Independent of the concrete impact of such initiatives, they 
are an empirical manifestation of an extension of the scope of identification. 
However, the length and complexity of current value chains as well as a “drag 
effect” of habitus hinders members of the externalisation society to become 
fully aware of their own interconnectedness with the exploitation of labour and 
nature, related to the current mode of production and consumption. This also 
includes a lack of identification with the related human suffering and a relative-
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ly weak support for the promotion of policies and political change that might 
alter this situation. Presumably, only if the mutual dependencies within global-
ised value chains become less one-sided, a substantial improvement of the 
working conditions will occur. Only then will it no longer be possible to exter-
nalise the negative consequences of one’s own lifestyle, and to live off the life 
chances of others. In other words, the current formation of value chains and 
related phenomena of externalisation are just one manifestation of what we call 
modernity. If social relationships on a global scale become more balanced, i.e. 
less unequal, a more “civilised” (in the Eliasian understanding) modernity 
could be possible, too.  
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